Moral psychology studies the features of cognition, judgement, perception and emotion that make human beings capable of moral action. Perspectives from feminist and race theory immensely enrich moral psychology. Writers who take these perspectives ask questions about mind, feeling, and action in contexts of social difference and unequal power and opportunity. These essays by a distinguished international cast of philosophers explore moral psychology as it connects to social life, scientific studies, and literature.

Thirty-eight individuals (mean age: 34.8 years old) participating in a 3-month yoga and meditation retreat were assessed before and after the intervention for psychometric measures, brain derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), circadian salivary cortisol levels, and pro- and anti-inflammatory cytokines. Participation in the retreat was found to be associated with decreases in self-reported anxiety and depression as well as increases in mindfulness. As hypothesized, increases in the plasma levels of BDNF and increases in the magnitude of the cortisol awakening response (CAR) (...) were also observed. The normalized change in BDNF levels was inversely correlated with BSI-18 anxiety scores at both the pre-retreat (r = 0.40, p < 0.05) and post-retreat (r = 0.52, p < 0.005) such that those with greater anxiety scores tended to exhibit smaller pre- to post-retreat increases in plasma BDNF levels. In line with a hypothesized decrease in inflammatory processes resulting from the yoga and meditation practices, we found that the plasma level of the anti-inflammatory cytokine Interleukin-10 was increased and the pro-inflammatory cytokine Interleukin-12 was reduced after the retreat. Contrary to our initial hypotheses, plasma levels of other pro-inflammatory cytokines, including Interferon Gamma (IFN-γ), Tumor Necrosis Factor (TNF-α), Interleukin-1β (IL-1β), Interleukin-6 (IL-6), and Interleukin-8 (IL-8) were increased after the retreat. Given evidence from previous studies of the positive effects of meditative practices on mental fitness, autonomic homeostasis and inflammatory status, we hypothesize that these findings are related to the meditative practices throughout the retreat; however, some of the observed changes may also be related to other aspects of the retreat such as physical exercise-related components of the yoga practice and diet. We hypothesize that the patterns of change observed here reflect mind-body integration and well-being. The increased BDNF levels observed is a potential mediator between meditative practices and brain health, the increased CAR is likely a reflection of increased dynamic physiological arousal, and the relationship of the dual enhancement of pro- and anti-inflammatory cytokine changes to healthy immunologic functioning is discussed. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

Section 17 of Leibniz’s Monadology contains a famous argument in which considerations of what it would be like to enter a machine that was as large as a mill are offered as reasons to reject materialism about the mental. In this paper, I provide a critical discussion of Leibniz’s mill argument, but, unlike most treatments, my discussion will focus on texts other than the Monadology in which considerations of the mill also appear. I provide a survey of three previous interpretations (...) of the argument and a partial defence of one of them, namely the one that Marc Bobro and I offered in Stepping Back Insider Leibniz's Mill (The Monist, 1998). However, I also argue that a fourth interpretation is necessary to account for the appearances of Leibniz’s mill in at least some of his writings. (shrink)

Leibniz’s reasons for rejecting materialism are complex and often rely on assumptions that are deeply puzzling to contemporary philosophers. However, the discussion of these issues in § 17 of the Monadology has received a lot of attention over the past couple of decades. For it is here that Leibniz presents the most well known version of his “mill argument.”.

Religion and spirituality (R/S) serve as coping mechanisms for circumstances that threaten people’s psychological well-being. However, using R/S inappropriately to deal with difficulties and problems in daily life may include the practice of Spiritual Bypass (SB). SB refers to avoiding addressing emotional problems and trauma, rather than healing and learning from them. On the other hand, coping strategies may be determined by the cultural context. This study aims to describe the presence of SB in individuals who may have experienced stressful (...) situations and to understand the influence of culture on SB by comparing SB in two culturally different groups. The sample consists of a total of 435 people, 262 of Honduran nationality and 173 of Spanish nationality. Both groups are approximately equivalent in age and gender. The degree of SB, stressful events, perception of social support and spiritual well-being are examined, respectively, through the Spiritual Bypass Scale, and specific items and subscales from the Social Readjustment Rating Scale, Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support, and the Functional Assessment of Chronic Illness Therapy - Spiritual Wellbeing. The results showed a higher spiritual well-being and use of SB in the Honduran sample as compared to the Spanish sample, but similar social support and stressful events. Furthermore, some of the factors predicting SB were different between the two samples. While age and a greater number of R/S practices were important in both samples, for the Honduran sample the variables that best explained SB were being a Christian, having greater social support, fewer stressful events, and greater attendance at church or temple. For the Spanish sample, however, the variable that best explained SB was studying R/S texts. Therefore, SB must be understood within the culture in which it develops, since in different cultural contexts it appears to relate to differing factors. Thus, SB becomes a possible functional or dysfunctional coping strategy depending on the social context. (shrink)

ABSTRACTJohn Stuart Mill devoted much of his life to developing a ‘science of morality’ to enhance the social, moral and intellectual character of individuals and society as a whole. His liberal as...

This chapter contains sections titled: Mill on Liberty Khomeini v. Rushdie Fukuyama Giving Up on the Arab World The Limits of Free Speech The Deontological and Utilitarian Justifications for Free Speech Clifford on the Duty to Critique Freedom of Speech and Philosophers on the Index Intolerance not Restricted to Islam Giniewski v. France Freethought under Fire People Are not Being Insulted for Having a Religion Racism without Race Social Criticism not Identical with the Urge to Provoke Flemming Rose on Why (...) He Published the Danish Cartoons The Theory of Evolution: Too Controversial to Defend? Is There Another Way to Discover the Truth than by Free Discussion? (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Pope Benedict XVI on the Apostles' Creed “Who Are You to Tell Believers What to Believe?” What Judaism, Christendom, and Islam Have in Common: Theism Divine Command Theories Abraham and Isaac The Story of Abraham in the Qur'an The Story of Jephtha Adherents of Divine Command Theory Command Ethics or Divine Command Ethics? An Assessment of Divine Command Ethics Kierkegaard and Mill Kohlberg and Moral Education Religious and Secular Ethics Worship Kant's Struggle with Moral Autonomy (...) and Free Speech Kant's Legacy in Nineteenth‐Century German Theology Schleiermacher as the Father of Modern Hermeneutics Armstrong's Plea for Liberal Interpretation A New Way to Look at the “Sacredness” of Scripture? Classic Books and Sacred Books Violating the Integrity of the Text Is Hermeneutics the Only Way to Modernize Traditions? Is Islam “Secularization‐Resistant”? Two Kinds of Reformers: Liberal Islam and Secular Islam. (shrink)

No study in the philosophy of science created such controversy in the seventies as Paul Feyerabend's Against Method. In this work, Feyerabend reviews that controversy, and extends his critique beyond the problem of scientific rules and methods, to the social function and direction of science today. In the first part of the book, he launches a sustained and irreverent attack on the prestige of science in the West. The lofty authority of the "expert" claimed by scientists is, he argues, (...) incompatible with any genuine democracy, and often merely serves to conceal entrenched prejudices and divided opinions with the scientific community itself. Feyerabend insists that these can and should be subjected to the arbitration of the lay population, whose closes interests they constantly affect—as struggles over atomic energy programs so powerfully attest. Calling for far greater diversity in the content of education to facilitate democratic decisions over such issues, Feyerabend recounts the origin and development of his own ideas—successively engaged by Brecht, Ehrenhaft, Popper, Mill and Lakatos—in a spirited intellectual self-portrait. Science in a Free Society is a striking intervention into one of the most topical debates in contemporary culture and politics. (shrink)

Although John Stuart Mill places considerable emphasis on three information signalling devices – debate, votes and prices – he remains curiously sceptical about the prospects of institutional or social epistemology. In this paper, I explore Mill's modest scepticism about institutional epistemolog y and compare and contrast that with the attitudes of liberal theorists such as F. A. Hayek and John Dewey who are much more enthusiastic about the prospects of social epistemology as part of their defences of liberalism. The paper (...) examines the extent to which Hayek and Dewey ignore concerns originally raised by Mill. I conclude that Mill's modest scepticism is reflected in the epistemological abstinence of contemporary liberal philosophers such as John Rawls, and that his elevation of philosophy over democracy remains a challenge to contemporary defenders of the political value of social or institutional epistemology. (shrink)

I claim that Mill has a theory of poetry which he uses to reconcile nineteenth century associationist psychology, the tendency of the intellect to dissolve associations, and the need for educated members of society to desire utilitarian ends. The heart of the argument is that Mill thinks reading poetry encourages us to feel the feelings of others, and thus to develop pleasurable associations with the pleasurable feelings of others and painful associations with the painful feelings of others. Once the associations (...) are developed, they are supported and maintained by our natural capacity for sympathy and by external elements in society, and provide motivation for the pursuit of utilitarian ends. Further, the additional support causes the associations to be strengthened to the extent that they come to be seen as ‘natural and necessary’, and as such are immune from the dissolving force of the intellect. (shrink)

This is lightly edited and referenced version of a presentation given at the 20th International Philosophy of Nursing conference in Quebec on 23rd August 2016. Philosophical texts are not given the same prominence in nurse education as their more valued younger sibling, primary research evidence, but they can influence practice through guidelines, codes and espoused values. John Stuart Mill’s harm principle, found in On Liberty, is not a universal law, and only a thoroughgoing libertarian would defend it as such, though (...) it, or its remnants, can be seen can be seen in policy documents. But its influence is weakening. Smoking bans in enclosed spaces were initially justified with other‐regarding considerations, but judgements from unsuccessful legal challenges from patients in UK psychiatric hospitals rely on preventing harm to the smoker, even when smoking outside, which does not harm others. In the wake of legislation, no‐smoking policies enacted by hospitals are becoming more aggressive, banning smoking both inside and outside, and extending the use of power gained through employment to prevent nurses assisting patients enjoy a lawful habit. Mill’s dictum has been subverted, and this speaks to the fundamental purpose of nursing. Should nurses collude and willingly exert their power for their version of the good of the patient? Or should they instead reaffirm values that support and facilitate life choices made by autonomous people? The paper supports the latter option, and this has wider application for nursing which can be illuminated, if not settled, by revisiting Mill and his famous dictum. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. ;John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx both understood real human freedom as self-determination. The following study will show that although the origins of these two notions of freedom are widely divergent, they are nevertheless similar in terms of the vision they incorporate of a fully emancipated existence. As both Mill and Marx were system builders in true nineteenth century fashion, I situate their conceptions of freedom within their general social sciences and (...) begin by assessing the content of their respective theories of human nature. This assessment reveals the methodological foundations of their systems and the impact they have on their understanding of the formation of human character. It also exposes certain inconsistencies which are later shown to have detrimental effects on their propositions regarding social progress. The second part of the study concentrates on Mill's and Marx's analysis of unfreedom in their own time and their different approaches to the task of securing liberty. It will be suggested that both thinkers compromised their commitment to freedom as self-determination; Mill became increasingly susceptible to elitist institutional arrangements; Marx dismissed too easily consideration of morality and rights. However, it will be proposed that the stronger elements of both views may in fact complement one another. (shrink)

Values of Beauty discusses major ideas and figures in the history of aesthetics from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the end of the twentieth century. The core of the book features Paul Guyer's essays on the epochal contribution of Immauel Kant, and sets Kant's work in the context of predecessors, contemporaries, and successors including David Hume, Alexander Gerard, Archibald Alison, Arthur Schopenhauer, and John Stuart Mill All of the essays emphasize the complexity rather than isolation of our (...) aesthetic experience of both nature and art; and the interconnection of aesthetic values such as beauty and sublimity on the one hand, and prudential and moral values on the other. Guyer emphasizes that the idea of the freedom of the imagination as the key to both artistic creation and aesthetic experience has been a common thread throughout the modern history of aesthetics, although the freedom of the imagination has been understood and connected to other forms of freedom in a variety of ways. (shrink)

La parole du mille-pattes Titre etrange pour un essai de philosophie politique qui convoque les auteurs qui, depuis Platon, s'efforcent de cerner ce qui fonde notre existence sociale. " C'est avec de bonnes paroles que le mille-pattes traverse un champ fleuri de fourmis. " Selon ce dicton de Cote-d'Ivoire, ce n'est qu'avec ces bonnes paroles, sinceres et raisonnables, que le mille-pattes a evite un conflit avec les fourmis. Noble ancienne tradition qui a souvent permis a la discussion collective de prevenir (...) la violence des vengeances. Au siecle des Lumieres, substituer le droit et le libre debat aux rapports de force fut une promesse liee a tout ideal democratique. Or les siecles qui ont suivi ont comme jamais deploye des violences massives, souvent au nom de la liberte et du droit. Ici et la, malgre tout, le debat public et le souci de reconciliation ont permis de depasser des contradictions qui paraissaient insurmontables. La metaphore du mille-pattes vient rappeler que ce fut longtemps une regle commune. Apres avoir depasse la logique des vengeances individuelles et collectives, la justice civile et internationale devient parfois une forme legale de vengeance des vainqueurs, qu'elle pretend pourtant remplacer. La popularite de Gandhi, Luther King et Mandela, qui ont triomphe par les vertus de la simple parole, est-elle un echo du passe de l'humanite ou la promesse d'une reinvention a venir de la politique? En reprenant ces questions a la lumiere de l'heritage de vingt-cinq siecles de pensee, tentons de tracer les contours de cette " philosophie du mille-pattes " que le monde actuel, plus violent et inegalitaire que jamais, laisse affleurer comme un avenir possible. (shrink)

We invoke a triple rationale to rebut Hooper and Spicer's argument against mandatory helmet laws. First, we use the laws of physics and empirical studies to show how bicycle helmets afford substantial protection to the user. We show that Hooper and Spicer erroneously downplay helmet utility and that, as a result, their attack on the utilitarian argument for mandatory helmet laws is weakened. Next, we refute their claim that helmet legislation comprises unjustified paternalism. We show the healthcare costs of bareheaded (...) riding to pose significant third party harms. It follows, we argue, that a utilitarian case for helmet laws can be sustained by appeal to Mill's Harm Principle. Finally, we reject Hooper and Spicer's claim that helmet laws unjustly penalise cyclists for their own health-affecting behaviour. Rather, we show their argument to suffer by disanalogy with medical cases where injustice may be more evident, for example, denial of bypass surgery to smokers. We conclude that mandatory helmet laws offer substantial utility and are entirely defensible within the framework of a liberal democracy. (shrink)

The readings collected here—of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Rosa Luxemburg, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and Antonio Gramsci— reflect the experience of the labor, socialist, and communist movements that did so much to shape modern history. A dedication to working-class revolution gives coherence to the influential philosophical, economic, sociological, and historical works of these writers. Paul Le Blanc's introductory essay probes the structure and dynamics of Marxism as a political orientation, tracing connections among components that can be found in (...) the readings: the theory of capitalist development, the theory of the labor movement, the strategy of revolution, the conception of the transition to socialism. Others identified with the Marxist tradition—such as Plekhanov, Kautsky, Stalin, Mao—are also discussed, and attention is given to perspectives of such varied critics of Marxism as Sidney Hook, Bertram D. Wolfe, James Burnham, Daniel Bell, Robert Heilbroner, and C. Wright Mills. Historical reflections are blended with discussion of the durability of capitalism, the disappointment of hopes for workers' revolution, the "collapse of communism," issues of race and gender, the environment, and challenges of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

In this paper, we show that the question of the relative importance of innate characteristics and institutional arrangements in explaining human difference was vehemently contested in Britain during the first half of the nineteenth century. Thus Sir Francis Galton’s work of the 1860s should be seen as an intervention in a pre-existing controversy. The central figure in these earlier debates—as well as many later ones—was the philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill. In Mill’s view, human nature was fundamentally shaped by (...) history and culture, factors that accounted for most mental and behavioral differences between men and women and among people of different classes, nationalities, and races. Indeed, Mill’s whole program of social reform depended on the assumption that human differences were not fixed by nature. To identify the leading figures in these disputes about difference and the concrete context in which they occurred, we explore three debates in which Mill played a key role: over the capacities and rights of women, the viability of peasant proprietorship in India and Ireland, and the status of black labor in Jamaica. The last two draw our attention to the important colonial context of the nature–nurture debate. We also show that ideas that for us seem of a piece were not always linked for these earlier thinkers, nor did views on innateness necessarily have the political correlates that we now take for granted. (shrink)

A critical survey of arguments for and against the morality and the legality of recreational drug use, deploying Feinberg's analysis of liberty-limiting principles.

Why is it that most among the relatively few moral philosophers since Kant who, like J. S. Mill, have discussed the question whether there can be moral duties to oneself, have answered it negatively? One reason is that those philosophers have supposed that all moral action must be, inter alia, social; and they may have thought so because of their commitment to what is here called a 'corporationist' moral view. But such a conception of morality as social is objectionable because (...) it does not square with ordinary opinion and because it introduces an artificial division between types of action which go together in real life. (shrink)

The relationship between Employer and Employees is a central one in the world of business. While an important relationship, it is one that is often a source of tension for the workplace. Employers are seemingly in constant mistrust of workers, while workers often look upon their bosses as "less than competent". In the American world of business today, should this "adversarial" relationship continue or should the Employer–Employee Relationship be governed by different rules. Immanuel Kant's Categorical Imperative offers some insights into (...) the way this relationship should be viewed. Also, the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead has some important points to add to the discussion of this crucial business relationship. A look at the case involving Malden Mills Textile Plant and its CEO Aaron Feuerstein will be used to launch this discussion. (shrink)

This paper examines some possibilities for the laws of nature changing over time. This is done within the context of recent literature on transformational emergence. Transformational emergence is a diachronic account of emergence that does not require the invariance of fundamental objects, properties, and laws. The requirement that no new laws are introduced after the first instance of the universe seems to indicate that all the laws of the universe are present from the outset. By using a dispositional approach to (...) fundamental properties, this restriction can be avoided. An argument appealing to quantitative laws of nature is then used to show that such laws are not, contrary to dispositional essentialism, metaphysically necessary. Further arguments are given to support the possibility of change of laws across time rather than across worlds and why the identity conditions for properties are different in the two cases. The paper is framed by an analysis of John Stuart Mill’s reasons for imposing the invariance requirement on fundamental laws. (shrink)

Cette oeuvre fait partie de la s rie TREDITION CLASSICS. La maison d' dition tredition, bas e Hambourg, a publi dans la s rie TREDITION CLASSICS des ouvrages anciens de plus de deux mill naires. Ils taient pour la plupart puis s ou unique-ment disponible chez les bouquinistes. La s rie est destin e pr server la litt rature et promouvoir la culture. Avec sa s rie TREDITION CLASSICS, tredition comme but de mettre disposition des milliers de classiques de la (...) litt rature mondiale dans diff rentes langues et de les diffuser dans le monde entier. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 263 articles, and supplementing his anthology of Wright (Liberal Arts Press). The biographical chapter presents Wright as an attractive character among devoted friends and also as a solitary, original scientist. Wright's primary achievement was to apply utilitarian principles to Darwinian natural selection theory. Since Darwin himself made no such attempt, nor did John Stuart Mill, and since Darwin showed an evident interest in Wright's attempt, this represents (...) a major contribution to evolutionary theory. On the negative side, too, Wright was incisive in his criticisms of Spencer, Mivart, Hamilton, Mansel, and Lewes. The pragmatic strains in Wright's philosophical method were incidental to his primary interest in showing that sciences are metaphysically "neutral." But his influence on Peirce and James was direct and strong, both on their cosmological and methodological doctrines. He deserves to be mentioned as the prime mover in this trinity of early pragmatism and naturalism, but since his own writings were relatively few and scattered, his historical importance rests largely on the use which Peirce and James made of his ideas and the development which they gave to his philosophy. HER~VRTW. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California Propos sur Jules Lequier: Philosophe de la libert~--R~flexions sur sa vie et sur sa pens~e. Par s Callot. (Paris: l~ditions Marcel Rivi~re et Cie, 1962. Pp. 142 [1]. Biblioth6que Philosophique.) L'oeuvre de Jules Lequier est importante. Nos philosophes am~ricains Charles Hartshorne et William L. Reese en ont fait un grand ~loge dans leur Philosophers Speak of God (pp. ix, 17, 109, 118, 227-230). Dans ce nouveau livre I~mile Callot nous donne des rfiflexions, des considerations, vraiment des Propos sur Jules Lequier en occasion du centenaire de la mort de Lequier (1862). La vie de Lequier est incontestablement dramatique. N~ en 1814 en Br6tagne off il passa son enfance, Lequier subit l'influence de son pays natal, de sa m~re dont il ~tait le ills unique, et d'une 6ducation profond~ment catholique. I1 entra ~t l'l~cole Polytechnique et il en sortit peu apr~s. Mais il y connut Renouvier et c'est grace ~ Renouvier que la pens~e de Lequier nous est connue. Renouvier intercala dans ses livres des fragments de Lequier et en publia des bonnes pages sous ce titre La recherche d'une premiOre v~rit& A l'~ge de 37 ans Lequier eut un acc6s de dfimence. Puis il eut un amour exaltfi pour une jeune fille qui le refusa en mariage. Lequier mourut, noy~, ~t l'~ge de 48 ans. De sa fin il nous est impossible de savoir si elle a 6t~ un suicide ou un accident, mais Lequier garda toujours con- 264 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY science de son g6nie: "Je crois avoir trouv6 un myst~re merveilleux de simplicitY, de profondeur et de t~n6bres: quelque chose h quoi nul ne pense." Lequier est un philosophe de la libert& Tout philosophe part de l'id& de v~rit~, cela est n&essaire, mais la prudence exige qu'on la mette sans cesse en cause. Comme Vinet (1797-1847) a dit, "La v6rit~, sans la recherche de la verit6, n'est que la moiti~ de la v~rit& On ne salt bien que ce qu'on n'a pas su toujours; on ne croit bien qu'apr& avoir dour6; on n'est vainqueur qu'apr6s avoir &6 vaincu. Et c'est pourquoi, en cette mati~re, notre premier effort doit avoir pour objet de mettre l'homme en demeure de choisir." Lequier avait eu tr& fort le sentiment du d&erminisme universel. Mais, au moment oth la croyance ~ la n&essit6 semblait devoir triompher dans son esprit, il la rejetta brusquement "par une r&olte de l'&re entier." Selon Lequier, la premiere et fondamentale d6marche de l'esprit est une affirmation de la libert~ par la libert6 m~me. La libert~ ne cr& pas la v6rit6, mais la croyance en la libert6 est une premi6re v6rit6. Sans cette croyance, on ne peut rien chercher et rien d&ouvrir. Mais l'homme, auteur de ses actes par la libertY, ne l'est pas de sa libert& Le Dieu de la Bible est un &re infini qui rien ne peut &happer. Ainsi le probl6me entier de la pr6destination se pose ici de nouveau. Et Lequier d&ouvre une solution originale: Si Dieu... (shrink)

By reading a novel by George Eliot alongside a novel by her Indian contemporary Fakir Mohan Senapati, this essay offers a cross-cultural comparison of fictional realisms. In The Mill on the Floss , Eliot used a learned narrator and extended forms of free indirect discourse to examine humble life with unprecedented sympathy and complexity, but the formal dissonance between the authoritative narrative voice and class-marked forms of represented speech construct a view of the lower classes from “above”—that is, from the (...) vantage point of the educated middle-class readers whom Eliot implicitly constructs as the agents of history. By contrast, Senapati’s Six Acres and a Third , written in the demotic Indian language of Oriya, achieves a view from “below” through an ironic narrator who parodies the very type of learned discourse that Eliot deploys as the instrument of liberal humanism. By thus evacuating a discursive cultural authority, Senapati produces a dialogic interplay of voices that brings the reader into the lives of his impoverished villagers without sentimentality or condescension—an achievement that in some ways resembles later European modernism as much as the realism of Eliot. (shrink)

Here are some of the most important discoveries in the history of medicine: blood circulation (1620s), vaccination, (1790s), anesthesia (1840s), germ theory (1860s), X- rays (1895), vitamins (early 1900s), antibiotics (1920s-1930s), insulin (1920s), and oncogenes (1970s). This list is highly varied, as it includes basic medical knowledge such has Harvey’s account of how the heart pumps blood, hypotheses about the causes of disease such as the germ theory, ideas about the treatments of diseases such as antibiotics, and medical instruments such (...) as X-ray machines. The philosophy of medicine should be able to contribute to understanding of the nature of discoveries such as these. The great originators of the field of philosophy of science were all concerned with the nature of scientific discovery, including Francis Bacon (1960), William Whewell (1967), John Stuart Mill (1974), and Charles Peirce (1931-1958). The rise of logical positivism in the 1930s pushed discovery off the philosophical agenda, but the topic was revived through the work of philosophers such as Norwood Russell Hanson (1958), Thomas Nickles (1980), Lindley Darden (1991, 2006), and Nancy Nersessian (1984). Scientific discovery has also become an object of investigations for researchers in the fields of cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence, as seen in the work of Herbert Simon, Pat Langley, and others (Langley et al., 1987; Klahr, 2000). Today, scientific September 14, 2009 discovery is an interdisciplinary topic at the intersection of the philosophy, history, and psychology of science. The aim of this chapter is to identify patterns of discovery that illuminate some of the most important developments in the history of medicine. I have used a variety of sources to identify forty great medical discoveries (Adler, 2004; Friedman and Friedland, 1998; Science Channel, 2006; Strauss and Strauss, 2006).. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill wrote in the opening chapter of Utilitarianism, ‘A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of ascertaining what is right or wrong,’ thus explaining why he thought the work to follow was practically important. In Chapter 3, ‘On the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility,’ he answers the question, ‘What are the motives to obey the principle of utility?’ This principle is presented as a morality to be adopted. Yet before the (...) nineteenth century was over Henry Sidgwick was proposing that it may well be best, from a utilitarian view, that the utilitarian doctrine is not too widely adopted. Perhaps it should be an esoteric morality.Moreover, Sidgwick argues, it seems contrary to self interest to adhere to an impartially benevolent morality. Devotion to utilitarian duty seems to require that the agent sacrifice his or her own happiness in a devotion to the relief of others that can only ‘partially mitigate’ their distress. Such a morality seems impossibly demanding. Sidgwick’s argument challenges Mill's claim that there is an adequate sanction for adoption of utilitarian morality. (shrink)

It is claimed that Arnold S. Kaufman's article ?On Alienation? (Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1965, pp. 141?65) shows no understanding of the concept of alienation, and the authors undertake to contrast the concept as Hegel and Marx develop it and Fromm and Mills re?state it, with Kaufman's interpretations of Marx, Fromm and Mills. They contrast the Marxist self?realization framework with Kaufman's want?satisfaction framework, and argue that in Marx alienation is necessarily concerned solely with labor, is unavoidable because (...) a necessary stage of self?development, and has inseparable sociological and moral aspects. They claim that Kaufman's article shows no understanding of any of these points. (shrink)

The Existentialist Reader is a comprehensive anthology of classic philosophical writings from eight key existentialist thinkers: Sartre, Camus, Heidegger, de Beauvoir, Jaspers, Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, and Ortega y Gasset. These substantial and carefully selected readings consider the distinctive concerns of existentialism: absurdity, anxiety, alienation, death. A comprehensive introduction by Paul S. MacDonald illuminates the existentialist quest for individual freedom and authentic human experience with insight into the historical and intellectual background of these major figures. The Existentialist Reader is a valuable (...) guide to the provocative theories that shook the philosophical world in the 1930s and continue to profoundly shape the way we think about ourselves. (shrink)

This book is the fourth in a series of essay collections on defences in private law. It addresses defences to liability arising in equity. The essays range from those adopting a mainly doctrinal perspective to others that explore the law from a more philosophical perspective. Some essays concentrate on specific defences, while others are concerned with the links between defences, or with how defences relate to the structure of the law of equity generally. One aim of the book is to (...) shed light on equitable doctrines by analysing them through the lens of defences. The essays offer original contributions to this complex, important but neglected field of scholarly investigation. The contributors – judges, practitioners and academics – are all distinguished jurists. The essays are addressed to all of the major common law jurisdictions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 263 articles, and supplementing his anthology of Wright (Liberal Arts Press). The biographical chapter presents Wright as an attractive character among devoted friends and also as a solitary, original scientist. Wright's primary achievement was to apply utilitarian principles to Darwinian natural selection theory. Since Darwin himself made no such attempt, nor did John Stuart Mill, and since Darwin showed an evident interest in Wright's attempt, this represents (...) a major contribution to evolutionary theory. On the negative side, too, Wright was incisive in his criticisms of Spencer, Mivart, Hamilton, Mansel, and Lewes. The pragmatic strains in Wright's philosophical method were incidental to his primary interest in showing that sciences are metaphysically "neutral." But his influence on Peirce and James was direct and strong, both on their cosmological and methodological doctrines. He deserves to be mentioned as the prime mover in this trinity of early pragmatism and naturalism, but since his own writings were relatively few and scattered, his historical importance rests largely on the use which Peirce and James made of his ideas and the development which they gave to his philosophy. HER~VRTW. SCHNEIDER Claremont, California Propos sur Jules Lequier: Philosophe de la libert~--R~flexions sur sa vie et sur sa pens~e. Par s Callot. (Paris: l~ditions Marcel Rivi~re et Cie, 1962. Pp. 142 [1]. Biblioth6que Philosophique.) L'oeuvre de Jules Lequier est importante. Nos philosophes am~ricains Charles Hartshorne et William L. Reese en ont fait un grand ~loge dans leur Philosophers Speak of God (pp. ix, 17, 109, 118, 227-230). Dans ce nouveau livre I~mile Callot nous donne des rfiflexions, des considerations, vraiment des Propos sur Jules Lequier en occasion du centenaire de la mort de Lequier (1862). La vie de Lequier est incontestablement dramatique. N~ en 1814 en Br6tagne off il passa son enfance, Lequier subit l'influence de son pays natal, de sa m~re dont il ~tait le ills unique, et d'une 6ducation profond~ment catholique. I1 entra ~t l'l~cole Polytechnique et il en sortit peu apr~s. Mais il y connut Renouvier et c'est grace ~ Renouvier que la pens~e de Lequier nous est connue. Renouvier intercala dans ses livres des fragments de Lequier et en publia des bonnes pages sous ce titre La recherche d'une premiOre v~rit& A l'~ge de 37 ans Lequier eut un acc6s de dfimence. Puis il eut un amour exaltfi pour une jeune fille qui le refusa en mariage. Lequier mourut, noy~, ~t l'~ge de 48 ans. De sa fin il nous est impossible de savoir si elle a 6t~ un suicide ou un accident, mais Lequier garda toujours con- 264 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY science de son g6nie: "Je crois avoir trouv6 un myst~re merveilleux de simplicitY, de profondeur et de t~n6bres: quelque chose h quoi nul ne pense." Lequier est un philosophe de la libert& Tout philosophe part de l'id& de v~rit~, cela est n&essaire, mais la prudence exige qu'on la mette sans cesse en cause. Comme Vinet (1797-1847) a dit, "La v6rit~, sans la recherche de la verit6, n'est que la moiti~ de la v~rit& On ne salt bien que ce qu'on n'a pas su toujours; on ne croit bien qu'apr& avoir dour6; on n'est vainqueur qu'apr6s avoir &6 vaincu. Et c'est pourquoi, en cette mati~re, notre premier effort doit avoir pour objet de mettre l'homme en demeure de choisir." Lequier avait eu tr& fort le sentiment du d&erminisme universel. Mais, au moment oth la croyance ~ la n&essit6 semblait devoir triompher dans son esprit, il la rejetta brusquement "par une r&olte de l'&re entier." Selon Lequier, la premiere et fondamentale d6marche de l'esprit est une affirmation de la libert~ par la libert6 m~me. La libert~ ne cr& pas la v6rit6, mais la croyance en la libert6 est une premi6re v6rit6. Sans cette croyance, on ne peut rien chercher et rien d&ouvrir. Mais l'homme, auteur de ses actes par la libertY, ne l'est pas de sa libert& Le Dieu de la Bible est un &re infini qui rien ne peut &happer. Ainsi le probl6me entier de la pr6destination se pose ici de nouveau. Et Lequier d&ouvre une solution originale: Si Dieu... (shrink)

Voluntariness of consent to research has not been sufficiently explored through empirical research. The aims of this study were to develop a more comprehensive approach to assessing voluntariness and to generate preliminary data on the extent and correlates of limitations on voluntariness. We developed a questionnaire to evaluate subjects’ reported motivations and constraints on voluntariness. 88 subjects in five different areas of clinical research—substance abuse, cancer, HIV, interventional cardiology, and depression—were assessed. Subjects reported a variety of motivations for participation. Offers (...) of financial incentives were common but not influential, pressures from others were rare, and no threats were reported. However, certain financial incentives and—paradoxically—altruistic motivations led some subjects to feel more constrained. Consistent with previous studies, no one pattern of motivation was common to all research subjects. There was little evidence of constrained voluntariness, but some suggestion of areas of concern. Voluntariness appears to be susceptible to systematic empirical investigation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ought We to Require Emotional Capacity as Part of Decisional Competence?Paul S. Appelbaum* (bio)AbstractThe preceding commentary by Louis Charland suggests that traditional cognitive views of decision-making competence err in not taking into account patients’ emotional capacities. Examined closely, however, Charland’s argument fails to escape the cognitive bias that he condemns. However, there may be stronger arguments for broadening the focus of competence assessment to include emotional capacities, centering (...) on the ways in which emotions aid humans in processing information. Before emotional capacities are added to the list of functions essential for decisional competence, though, the feasibility and utility of such a reorientation must be demonstrated.To what extent ought persons’ capacities to experience emotion be taken into account when determining whether they should be deemed competent to make their own decisions? In the previous article, Louis Charland (1998) argues that traditional models of decision-making competence—of which the MacArthur Competence Treatment Study is a typical example—are mistaken in focusing narrowly on persons’ cognitive abilities to the neglect of emotional factors. In contrast, he suggests, constructs of competence ought explicitly to require a capacity to experience emotions, which he believes is central to meaningful decision making, before deeming persons competent.Charland, as he acknowledges, is not the first to suggest that the presence of some degree of emotional capacity is a necessary element of competence, but his argument is among the most elaborate to date and is certainly worth closer examination. Looked at carefully, however, Charland’s argument does not make quite the case for the determination of emotional capacity in competence assessment that he claims for it. Indeed, as I demonstrate below, Charland may share the same “pernicious [End Page 377] cognitive bias” that he ascribes to more traditional approaches. However, despite what I identify as the problems in Charland’s argument, others have raised more disturbing questions about the lack of attention to emotional issues in competence assessment. Thus, I am not ready to reject entirely the possibility that determinations of decisional competence ought to consider emotional factors. I conclude by outlining the questions that remain to be answered to identify more clearly the potential benefits of such an approach.The Construct of Decision-Making CompetenceSome preliminary comments about the nature of the dominant construct of decision-making competence may provide a useful frame for my response to Charland’s paper. Contemporary ideas of competence are tied inextricably to the ideal of self-determination in modern Western societies. Such societies are committed to respect for individual choice, both as a good in its own right and on the grounds that each person knows best what choices will maximize his or her own welfare. In general, therefore, states will not intervene to prevent persons from acting on their decisions, even when the choices they make—like the decision to smoke or to refuse potentially life-saving medical care—may objectively be thought to be detrimental to them.In some cases, however, the presumption that people will act in their own interests, as well as the notion that there is something intrinsically valuable in respecting their choices, fails (Buchanan and Brock 1989). When people’s minds are so disordered that they cannot be said to be making meaningful choices, other values come into play. Such people are called “incompetent.” When persons reach that point, the state’s interest in protecting its citizens becomes primary and someone else must make decisions on their behalf. Note that the size of this group must be sharply limited, lest a liberal society’s commitment to self-determination be undermined: There is no more profound infringement of the rights of citizens than the determination that they are incompetent. Thus, the criteria for incompetence must be selected in a deliberately narrow fashion—alternately, one might say that the standards for competence are made intentionally broad—so that all but a tiny percentage of citizens will be permitted to make decisions on their own.In the Anglo-American world, the process of formulating criteria of competence by and large has been left to the common law courts. Over the course of centuries they have identified the capacities that are, in... (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 5, May 2019, Page 22-24.

At a university where demand for an introductory ethics course is huge and spans many disciplines, it is challenging to achieve the appropriate degree of generality such that many students could take the course as their single exposure to ethics while others would find it sufficiently challenging and interesting to continue in philosophy. This paper discusses the considerations that led to a course focused on “expert ethical discourse.” Directed to a primarily non-traditional student body, this course aims for analytical skills (...) that are highly relevant to students’ lives. Its goal is thus closer to “ethical literacy” than familiarity with the Western ethical canon (e.g. Aristotle, Kant, Mill). Taking seriously a number of feminist and post-modernist criticisms applicable to traditional ethics courses, “Ethical Inquiry” seeks to introduce students to dominant discourses on ethics (those which are highly influential on how people think and talk about ethics). Most of these discourses belong to disciplines other than philosophy, but the course uses philosophical tools for understanding and critiquing them, resembling a “moral critical theory” approach. After recounting faculty objections to this approach, the author reviews the course’s texts, how each discourse’s limits were approached, and the benefits and drawbacks of each text in the classroom. (shrink)

(2002). Clarifying the Ethics of Clinical Research: A Path toward Avoiding the Therapeutic Misconception. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 22-23.

Genomic research—including whole genome sequencing and whole exome sequencing—has a growing presence in contemporary biomedical investigation. The capacity of sequencing techniques to generate results that go beyond the primary aims of the research—historically referred to as “incidental findings”—has generated considerable discussion as to how this information should be handled—that is, whether incidental results should be returned, and if so, which ones.Federal regulations governing most human subjects research in the United States require the disclosure of “the procedures to be followed” in (...) the research as part of the informed consent process. It seems reasonable to assume—and indeed, many commentators have concluded—that genomic investigators will be expected to inform participants about, among other procedures, the prospect that incidental findings will become available and the mechanisms for dealing with them. Investigators, most of whom will not have dealt with these issues before, will face considerable challenges in framing meaningful disclosures for research participants.To help in this task, we undertook to identify the elements that should be included in the informed consent process related to incidental findings. We did this by surveying a large number of genomic researchers (n = 241) and by conducting in‐depth interviews with a smaller number of researchers (n = 28) and genomic research participants (n = 20). Based on these findings, it seems clear to us that routine approaches to informed consent are not likely to be effective in genomic research in which the prospect of incidental findings exists. Ensuring that participants’ decisions are informed and meaningful will require innovative approaches to dealing with the consent issue. We have identified four prototypical models of a consent process for return of incidental findings. (shrink)